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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE
NONPARTICIPATING MINERAL OWNER
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the mineral rights to a particular piece of property are
owned by more than one person. It is not uncommon for one of these
owners to have the exclusive right to enter into and execute a lease of the
minerals for the benefit of all the parties.1 Unfortunately, the owner
holding the executive rights may favor himself over the other owners
with respect to the terms of a lease that he may enter into with a lessee of
the minerals. Clearly, the potential for the executive owner to favor him-
self over the nonexecutive owner creates an inherent conflict of interest
between the executive and the nonexecutive owners.
The courts in Texas and Oklahoma have developed different ap-
proaches in attempting to address this situation. Under the Texas ap-
proach, the interests created in a lease of the minerals by the executive
owner and the lessee are defined as either a royalty or a bonus, and the
nonexecutive owner is allowed to participate in one or the other.2 The
Oklahoma approach, on the other hand, examines the intent of the par-
ties to ascertain whether the nonexecutive should be allowed to partici-
pate in the created interests.3
This Comment will first discuss the nature and characteristics of
executive versus nonexecutive ownership. Next, the strengths and weak-
nesses of the various approaches utilized by the courts to handle this
conflict of interest problem will be analyzed in relation to several impor-
tant competing policy concerns. Finally, an alternative approach will be
proposed and analyzed as to its strengths and weaknesses in relation to
the same competing policies.
1. The exclusive right to enter into and execute mineral leases is referred to as the "executive
right." See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 250 (5th ed. 1981);
Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, 26 TEx. L. REv. 569 (1948).
2. See Griffith v. Taylor, 156 Tex. 1, 291 S.W.2d 673 (1956).
3. See Gungoll v. Bierig, 55 OKLA. B.J. 971 (May 8, 1984); Sykes v. Dillingham, 318 P.2d 416
(Okla. 1957).
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF EXECUTIVE, NONEXECUTIVE, AND
NONPARTICIPATING OWNERSHIP
In order to understand the inherent conflict of interest between an
executive owner and a nonexecutive owner of the same minerals, 4 it is
first necessary to understand the nature of each type of ownership. Own-
ership of a mineral interest involves much more than just the ownership
of the minerals themselves.' Basically, the ownership of a mineral inter-
est involves three rights:'
1. The right to reasonably use the surface of the land under which
the minerals lay in order to search for, develop, and produce the
minerals.7
2. The right to bonus,8 rental,9 or royalty' ° benefits under an oil and
gas lease. 11
4. While an entire body of law has developed as to what constitutes a mineral, further refer-
ences to "minerals" in this Comment should be understood to mean oil and natural gas and other
such hydrocarbons. See, eg., Recent Development, Texas Reexamines the Meaning of 'Minerals':
Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 19 Tulsa L.J. 448 (1984).
5. A mineral interest involves the right to search for, develop and produce the minerals from a
described premises and, in some states, the right to present possession of the minerals in place under
the property. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 202.2, 203.3 (1983).
6. Id. § 301.
7. See id. § 202.2.
8. "Bonus" has been defined as "a premium paid to a grantor or vendor and strictly is the cash
consideration or down payment, paid or agreed to be paid, for the execution of an oil and gas lease."
Carroll v. Bowen, 180 Okla. 215, 217, 68 P.2d 773, 775 (1937). The definition of "bonus" in Texas is
"a sum certain to be paid in cash or out of production. Griffith v. Taylor, 156 Tex. 1, -, 291
S.W.2d 673, 676 (1956).
9. "Rental" refers to the yearly delay-rental payments that usually must be paid by the lessee
to preserve an oil and gas lease. These payments are made to defer the commencement of drilling
operations or the commencement of production during the primary term of the lease. See H. WIL-
LIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, at 175-76.
10. "Royalty" usually refers to the mineral owner's share of production, free of the expenses of
production. It has been defined as "a payment of a part or percentage of production under a lease
which is to continue throughout the life of the lease .. " Griffith v. Taylor, 156 Tex. 1, -, 291
S.W.2d 673, 676 (1956). The mineral owner's royalty is usually expressed as Vsth of production, but
can be any other fractional share of production that can be bargained for with the lessee. See id. at
291 S.W.2d at 676-77.
While the three basic lease benefits are bonus, rental, and royalty, there are other hybrids that
commonly exist today such as oil or production payments and net profits interests. An oil or pro-
duction payment is a share of the oil produced from a described tract of land, free of costs of produc-
tion, which terminates when a certain sum from the sale of such oil is realized. H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, supra note 1, at 457, 493, 583. See State v. Quintana Petroleum Corp., 134 Tex. 179, -,
133 S.W.2d 112, 114-15 (1939); Tennant v. Dunn, 130 Tex. 285, -, 110 S.W.2d 53, 56 (1937); see
also Walker, Oil Payments, 20 TEx. L. REv. 259 (1942) (discussing the creation, nature, and use of
oil payments in oil and gas transactions).
A net profits interest is a share of gross production from a property, measured by net profits
from operation of the property. See Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Donnelly, 394 F.2d 273,
277 (5th Cir. 1968); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Texas, 286 F.2d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 1961).
11. The mineral interest owner has the right to whatever benefits are provided to him, as lessor
of the minerals, under the terms of the lease that transfers the right to develop the minerals to the
lessee. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, § 301.
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3. The right to lease or sell the mineral interest.1 2
When a fraction of the mineral interest owned by one mineral owner
is transferred to another, then the grantee of the fractional mineral inter-
est also owns a proportionate share of these three rights. For example,
should the sole mineral owner subsequently convey a one-half mineral
interest by mineral deed to another party, then both parties would own
one-half of each of the three rights of mineral ownership.
Additionally, the mineral interest owner may want to sever some of
the rights of mineral ownership 13 and reserve to himself the exclusive
right to lease the minerals. The party with the exclusive right to lease the
minerals is called the executive owner while the party without this right
is called the nonexecutive owner.14 Although both the executive and
nonexecutive owners may share equally in the lease benefits,15 only the
executive owner can execute a lease on the property or develop the min-
erals himself.6
12. The right to lease is more commonly known as the executive right. See id § 2022.
13. Superior Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 150 Tex. 317, 240 S.W.2d 281 (1951); Odstreil
v. McGlaun, 230 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals has explained the concept as follows:
The owner of a mineral estate possesses a bundle of interests which can be separately
conveyed or reserved; these include the rights to execute oil, gas and mineral leases, and
the right to receive bonuses, rental and royalties. As indicated, each can be severed into a
separate interest, and each is a property right ...
Extraction Resources, Inc. v. Freeman, 555 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
14. There are some cases which hold that the severance of the executive right from the mineral
estate creates a nonleasing interest which is in essence a perpetual royalty interest violating the Rule
Against Perpetuities. See Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114 P.2d 646 (1941); Cosgrove
v. Young, 230 Kan. 705, 642 P.2d 75 (1982); Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419, 227 P.2d 136
(1951). However, there is substantial case law to the contrary holding that the severance of the
executive right does not violate the Rule. See Hanson v. Ware, 224 Ark. 430, 274 S.W.2d 359
(1955); Keville v. Hollister Co., 29 Cal. App. 3d 203, 105 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1972); Price v. Atlantic
Refining Co., 79 N.M. 629, 447 P.2d 509 (1968); J.M. Huber Corp. v. Square Enter., Inc., 645
S.W.2d 410 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).
The more recent view as evidenced by the latter set of cases is that the severance of the execu-
tive right does not violate the Rule. For purposes of this Comment it will be assumed that such view
is correct.
15. Theoretically, the mere grant or reservation of the executive right does not deprive the
nonexecutive owner of the right to participate in lease benefits. Houston v. Moore Inv. Co., 559
S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). The court in Houston stated that "[a] grantor who reserves
half of the minerals retains half of all the incidents [rights] of ownership inherent in the minerals
except those specifically granted." Id.
16. The mere grant or reservation of one of the rights of mineral ownership should have no
effect on the other rights of mineral ownership. See supra note 11. However, there is a school of
thought which holds that when an individual owns the executive rights it is presumed that he alone
will be permitted to develop the property, either by leasing the minerals to another or by producing
the minerals himself. See Hudgins v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 144 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Tex. 1956).
This view is also advocated by Williams and Meyers:
The right to lease and the right to develop are correlative. Ownership of land carries
with it the right to use the land, including the exploitation of the minerals. The right to
3
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Furthermore, it is also possible to divide the lease benefits between
the parties. When the nonexecutive owner does not participate in reve-
nues generated by one or more of the lease benefits, then the nonexecu-
tive owner is referred to as a nonparticipating nonexecutive mineral
interest owner. 17 For example, this could be accomplished by the follow-
ing clause in the instrument granting the mineral interest: "Grantor
grants to Grantee one-half of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under
the Subject Property, but Grantor reserves all right to bonus and rentals
and the exclusive right to execute leases of the minerals in and under the
Subject Property." 8
Although stated in simplistic language, the clause not only provides
for the grantee to become the nonexecutive owner by virtue of the gran-
tor's reservation of the exclusive right to lease the minerals, but it also
prevents the grantee from participating in revenues generated by a
lessee's payment of bonus and delay rentals. Consequently, the grantee
has become a nonparticipating nonexecutive mineral interest owner and
is dependent upon the grantor as to the lease benefit terms negotiated
with a prospective lessee. Since the grantee will only share in royalty
proceeds, the grantor could attempt to negotiate a lease that would mini-
mize the royalty interest and maximize the bonus, thus allowing the
grantor to keep most of the revenues generated by leasing the minerals. 19
It is apparent that without some protection being afforded the grantee,
the grantor could enter into a lease that would be detrimental to the
grantee's interest.
The problem with the self-interest of the executive owner is also
exploit minerals for his own account is a basis for the right of a mineral owner to lease the
land to others who exploit the minerals in his place. The mineral owner's right to develop
and to lease cannot be exercised simultaneously, at least in practice, since leases always
convey the exclusive right to operate on the land. Thus it is unlikely in the extreme that
parties who create a nonleasing interest in land intend for the owner to be able to exploit
the minerals.
The practical results of separating the development right from the executive right
would be disastrous: if the nonexecutive could develop at any time, despite the execution
of a lease covering the land, no lease is likely to be executed because operators could not
afford the risk.
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, § 304.10.
17. The term "nonparticipating" simply means that the nonexecutive will not share in the reve-
nues generated by bonus and rental payments. See generally Jones, Exercise ofExecutive Rights in
Connection with Non-Participating Royalty and Non-Executive Mineral Interests, 15 INST. ON OIL &
GAS L. & TAX'N 35 (1964) (discussing the definitions of and distinctions among executive, nonex-
ecutive, and nonparticipating interests).
18. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 327.3.
19. It is assumed in this illustration that the grantor's financial position is such that tax consid-
erations do not require him to elect to receive more revenue in the form of royalty payments even
though he would have to share such revenue with the grantee.
[Vol. 20:433
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present when there is a nonparticipating royalty interest owner.20 The
owner of a nonparticipating royalty interest only owns the right to par-
ticipate in the royalty revenues derived from a lease of the minerals. A
nonparticipating royalty interest has a well-understood meaning in the
oil and gas industry" and has been defined as,
an interest in the gross production of oil, gas, and other minerals
carved out of the mineral estate as a free royalty, which does not carry
with it the right to participate in the execution of, the bonus payable
for, or the delay rentals to accrue under, oil, gas, and mineral leases
executed by the owner of the mineral fee estate. 2
The language in the conveying instrument necessary to create a non-
participating royalty interest owner may be worded similarly to one of
the two following clauses:
1. Grantor grants to Grantee an undivided 1/16th interest in any and
all Royalty on oil, gas, and other minerals produced from the Sub-
ject Property: or 2 3
2. Grantor grants to Grantee an undivided 1/16th interest in and to
all the oil, gas, and other minerals that may be produced and saved
from the Subject Property.2 4
Should the instrument containing the second clause fail to contain other
clauses normally associated with mineral deeds25 and contain clauses
normally associated with royalty deeds,2 6 then most authorities woiild
20. The owner of a nonparticipating royalty interest, like the owner of a nonparticipating
nonexecutive mineral interest, does not have the right to enter into a lease of the minerals nor the
right to enter upon the land for the purpose of exploring for or producing oil, natural gas, or other
minerals. See Meyers & Ray, Perpetual Royalty and Other Non-Executive Interests in Minerals, 29
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 651, 656 (1983) (wherein the authors set forth a theory that a nonexecu-
tive mineral interest is simply another type of royalty interest).
21. See Stokes v. Tutvet, 134 Mont. 250, 328 P.2d 1096 (1958); Arnold v. Ashbel Smith Land
Co., 307 S.W.2d 818 (rex. Civ. App. 1957); see also Jones, supra note 1, at 569 (discussing the nature
of a nonparticipating royalty interest).
22. See Jones, supra note 1, at 569.
23. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 327.2.
24. Id. § 327.1.
25. Typical clauses usually found in deeds meant to convey an interest in minerals are:
1) a specific grant of a right to ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of exploring
for minerals and developing the property.
2) a specific grant of the right to receive bonuses and rents which may accrue under the
terms of any lease that may then or thereafter cover the property.
Cf H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, §§ 303.2-303.4.
Basically, if the instrument involved attempts to grant an interest that has the distinguishing
characteristics of a mineral interest, such as the right to reasonable use of the surface to produce the
minerals, the right to lease the mineral interest, and the right to participate in lease benefits, then it
should be considered a mineral deed. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
26. An instrument which lacks the clauses referred to in note 25 and which references the fact
that the interest conveyed is meant to be free of costs of production should generally be considered a
royalty deed. See Maxwell, The Mineral-Royalty Distinction and the Expense of Production, 33 T~x.
L. REV. 463 (1955) (discussing the problems of distinguishing mineral and royalty grants).
1985]
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agree that such instrument would be construed to convey a fixed-fraction
royalty.27 If the interest conveyed is a fixed-fraction or fractional roy-
alty, then the nonparticipating royalty interest owner is entitled to
1/16th (6.25%) of all the minerals produced regardless of the terms of
the lease between the executive owner and the lessee. 28 Therefore, there
is no opportunity for the executive owner to favor himself over this type
of royalty interest owner in a leasing arrangement.
Should the instrument contain the first clause, however, then the
grantee would instead own a fraction of the royalty interest applicable to
the lease that the grantor negotiates with the lessee.29 It is in this situa-
tion that the grantee, as the nonparticipating royalty interest owner,
needs some protection from the self-interest of the executive owner.
Without any protection, the executive owner would undoubtedly favor
himself over the nonparticipating owners in a leasing arrangement. It is
evident that an owner of either a nonparticipating nonexecutive mineral
interest or a nonparticipating royalty interest has the same need for pro-
tection from the self-interest of the executive owner when that executive
owner is negotiating a lease with a prospective lessee. 31 In both situa-
tions, there is a substantial need for some kind of standard of care or
dutyto be imposed upon the executive owner when he is in a position to
affect the financial interests of the nonparticipating owners.31
The next portion of this Comment will focus on the approaches
taken by the courts in Texas and Oklahoma to decide to what extent the
executive owner may be able to favor himself over a nonparticipating
owner when negotiating the size and nature of the benefit terms in an oil
and gas lease.
27. See Meyers & Ray, supra note 20, at 664.
28. Id.
29. This means that the grantee will receive a certain fraction of the mineral owner royalty
revenues generated by the lease that the grantor negotiates with the lessee. In this case the grantee
will receive 1/16th of all such royalty revenues.
30. Whether a nonparticipating nonexecutive mineral interest and a nonparticipating royalty
interest are actually the same is the subject of some debate. Meyers and Ray argue that a nonexecu-
tive mineral interest is simply another type of royalty interest. See supra note 19 and accompanying
text. Professor Williams is also in accord with this view. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 5, § 338. However, Lee Jones contrasts the two interests and finds that, although they may
contain certain common attributes, they are, nonetheless, two distinct types of interests. See Jones,
Exercise of Executive Rights in Connection with Non-Participating Royalty and Non-Executive Min-
eral Interests, 15 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 35, 61-82 (1964).
31. For the remainder of this Comment both the nonparticipating nonexecutive mineral inter-




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss3/3
PROTECTING NONEXECUTIVE RIGHTS
III. CURRENT APPROACHES OF THE TEXAS AND OKLAHOMA
COURTS
A. Introduction
Naturally, if a well drilled on the premises is a good producing well,
generating substantial revenues, then everyone who owns an interest in
the minerals being extracted will want to receive as great a share of the
proceeds from the sale of those minerals as possible. The classic manner
in which the executive owner attempts to favor himself over the nonpar-
ticipating owner is for the executive owner to lease the minerals involved
for a certain specified royalty interest, certain specified bonus and rental
payments, and then attempt to create and reserve, solely for himself, an
additional interest in the lease.32 Generally, the executive owner will
want the additional interest characterized as a bonus payment so that the
nonparticipating owner will be precluded from receiving any of the pro-
ceeds attributable to the additionally created interest. Undoubtedly, a
nonparticipating owner, who because of the nature of his interest will
only share in the royalty proceeds, will want to have the additional inter-
est that the executive owner has reserved solely for his own benefit char-
acterized as a royalty interest, thereby entitling him to receive a share of
the proceeds generated by that interest.
B. The Texas Approaches
There have been several approaches taken by the courts in Texas to
determine whether a certain additionally created interest should be desig-
nated as a royalty interest or a bonus. The earliest approach by a Texas
court is evidenced by the case of State National Bank v. Morgan.33
In Morgan, the court construed whether an oil payment 4 of $48,000
provided for in a lease was a royalty interest in which the nonparticipat-
ing owner would share, or a bonus payment that would enure entirely to
the benefit of the executive owner.35 The court decided that all payments
in excess of the standard Vsth royalty36 are bonus payments as a matter
32. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Teas, 286 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1961); Gungoll v.
Bierig, 55 OLKA. B.J. 971 (May 8, 1984); Probst v. Ingram, 373 P.2d 58 (Okla. 1962); Sykes v.
Dillingham, 318 P.2d 416 (Okla. 1957); Delta Drilling Co. v. Simmons, 161 Tex. 122, 338 S.W.2d
143 (1960); State Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 509, 143 S.W.2d 757 (1940); Helms v. Guthrie,
573 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Portwood v. Buckalew, 521 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975); Lane v. Elkins, 441 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
33. 135 Tex. 509, 143 S.W.2d 757 (1940).
34. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
35. Morgan, 135 Tex. at -, 143 S.W.2d at 759.
36. The court noted that "[tihe fact ... that the usual royalty in oil and gas leases is V, is in
1985]
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of law.37 Therefore, the executive owner was allowed to keep all pro-
ceeds from the oil payments. 3
8
This approach has since been repudiated by the Texas Supreme
Court in Griffith v. Taylor.39 In Griffith, the executive owner leased the
minerals in question for a th royalty and "as additional consideration
. . , an equal one-sixteenth (1/16th) part of all oil [and gas] which may
be produced and saved by Lessee. . . ."I Again, the vital question was
whether "this 1/16th 'bonus royalty' which is the subject of this contro-
versy. . . is 'bonus' or 'royalty?' "41 In deciding this question, the court
developed a definitional test42 defining bonus as "a sum certain to be paid
in cash or out of production. . .,,,4 and royalty as "a reservation or a
payment of a part or percentage of production under a lease which is to
continue throughout the life of the lease. . . ."' Therefore, under Grif-
fith, a royalty interest continues in existence for the life of the lease and
the revenue generated from a royalty interest depends upon the relative
productivity of the lease. Alternatively, a bonus is an exact amount of
money to be paid and once it is paid the bonus interest no longer exists.
As a result, the court held that the interest created by the executive
owner in this particular instance fit the definition of a royalty,a" thus the
nonparticipating owner was entitled to receive his proportionate share of
the revenues generated by the interest."
This definitional approach, as set forth in Griffith, is the dominant
approach in Texas today.47 Under Griffith, it is apparent that any inter-
est created by an executive owner in a lease in addition to the standard
lessor's royalty will be considered a royalty if it bears the characteristics
our opinion one so generally known that judicial knowledge may be taken of it." Id. at -, 143
S.W.2d at 761.
37. Id. at -, 143 S.W.2d at 762.
38. Id. at-, 143 S.W.2d at 763.
39. 156 Tex. 1, 291 S.W.2d 673 (1956).
40. Id. at-, 291 S.W.2d at 675.
41. Id.
42. Id. at-, 291 S.W.2d at 676. Wherein the court stated with respect to defining the terms
"royalty" and "bonus" that "we think. . .that the legal meaning of the terms as declared in the




45. Id. at -, 291 S.W.2d at 676-77.
46. Id.
47. The following Texas cases are in accord with the Griffith approach: Delta Drilling Co. v.
Simmons, 161 Tex. 122, 338 S.W.2d 143 (1960); Portwood v. Buckalew, 521 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975); Lane v. Elkins, 441 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
[Vol. 20:433
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of a royalty, or a bonus if it bears the characteristics of a bonus, regard-
less of how the executive owner intended the interest to be considered.
C. The Oklahoma Approach
The Oklahoma courts have not followed the definitional approach
created in Griffith.4" Instead, Oklahoma has developed an approach
based on the intent of the parties. This approach was first manifested in
Sykes v. Dillingham.4 9 In Sykes, Mr. Dillingham conveyed to Mr. Sykes
his undivided V4 th mineral interest in a certain tract of land, reserving
of any bonus money derived from a future lessee." Eventually Mr. Sykes
leased the minerals for a cash bonus of $1,12551 and a royalty of 46/
256ths, 52 which was actually 14/256ths more than the standard royalty
at that time of lsth.53 Subsequently, a dispute arose over whether Mr.
Dillingham was entitled to of the excess 14/256ths royalty interest.
Mr. Dillingham claimed that the excess royalty was actually a bonus
payment and since he was entitled to share in of any bonus, then he
should be entitled to of the $1,125 and of the 14/256ths excess
royalty. 4 Again, the principal question was whether a nonparticipating
owner was entitled to share in the revenues generated by a certain addi-
tional interest created by an executive owner.55
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that Mr. Dillingham was en-
titled to of the cash bonus and to of the excess royalty.56 Rather
than looking to the characteristics and nature of the interest created, as
in the Griffith approach, 7 the court examined the intent of the parties to
the lease:5 8
48. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, § 328 (noting that other cases, except Sykes,
are in accord with the Grifflth view).
49. 318 P.2d 416 (Okla. 1957).
50. Id. at 417. Although not discussed in the case, Mr. Sykes, as grantee in this case, received
the right to execute leases and, therefore, would be deemed the executive owner. Mr. Dillingham, as
grantor, retained only the right to participate in half of the bonus. Mr. Dillingham was, therefore,
the nonparticipating owner, but was nonparticipating as to royalty revenue instead of bonus revenue
as opposed to the usual case where the nonparticipating owner is nonparticipating as to bonus
revenues.




55. Id. at 417. "The problem is to determine whether Dillingham is entitled to one-half of the
'bonus money' received by Sykes on a lease executed by him in 1952 and, if so whether the 'bonus
money' would include a portion of the 'excess royalty' under the 1952 lease." Id.
56. Id. at 419.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47.
58. See Sykes, 318 P.2d at 419-20.
1985]
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Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty as to the meaning of the
terms used in a written contract between the parties, usages and cus-
toms may be resorted to for the purpose of interpreting them and to fix
and explain the meaning of the expressions and words of doubtful and
various meanings.
59
The court concluded that the parties must have contemplated that Mr.
Sykes would be entitled to the usual and customary th royalty and that
both Mr. Sykes and Mr. Dillingham would share equally in the excess
royalty as bonus money derived from the lease.6° Apparently, the Sykes
approach is to construe the lease in question to determine the intent of
the parties as to how they contemplated certain additionally created in-
terests to be treated.
The Sykes approach has recently been upheld and followed in
Gungoll v. Bierig.61 The plaintiffs in Gungoll were the executive owners
of one-half of the minerals in a certain tract of land62 and the defendants
were the nonexecutive owners of the other half of the minerals, but were
nonparticipating as to bonuses and rentals.63 The executive owners nego-
tiated an oil and gas lease for a Vth royalty and "an additional 1/16th of
7/sths of Oil and Gas Production." 6 Again, the executive owners
claimed that the extra interest created was a bonus to which they alone
were entitled, while the nonparticipating owners claimed the additionally
created interest was actually a royalty interest from which they were en-
titled to receive revenues. 65 After examining the Sykes case, the court
construed the terms in the lease to determine the intent of the parties to
the lease66 and concluded that the terms clearly expressed an intent that
the additionally created interest was to be considered a royalty interest,
67
entitling the nonparticipating owners to of the revenues it generated.68
59. Id. at 419 (citing Cleveland v. Mascho, 95 Okla. 22, 222 P. 1008 (1923)).
60. Id. at 419-20.
61. Gungoll v. Bierig, 55 OKLa. B.J. 971 (May 8, 1984).
62. Id. at 971.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 972.
66. Id. at 972-73.
67. Id. at 973. The court stated with respect to the intention of the parties that the rider con-
taining the additional interest:
[W]hen construed against lessee clearly expresses an intent that the 1/16th of %ths over-
ride should be considered a royalty and not a bonus. The meaning of the clause is aided by
the use of the words "In addition to" and "additional." These words suggest that the
1/16th of 3/8ths was intended to be additional royalty-an overriding royalty. The empha-
sized words in context read: "In addition to the Y/ Royalty provided herein, lessor shall
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Although the court appears to agree with several Texas cases that state
that an executive owner has a duty to exact every benefit for the nonpar-
ticipating owner that he exacts for himself,69 the court nevertheless left
the door open for an executive owner to favor himself over the nonpartic-
ipating owner: "[H]ad the 1/16 of /8 overriding royalty been intended
by the executive to be a bonus, he could have easily specified this in the
lease."70
From the Sykes and Gungoll cases, it can be seen that the Oklahoma
approach determines the intent of the parties to a lease by construing the
intended nature of an interest created in the lease. It would appear that
under this approach, an executive owner would be allowed to create an
interest in addition to the traditional lessor's royalty and reserve the ad-
ditional interest solely for himself, so long as the lease clearly expressed
an intention on the part of the executive owner that the interest was to be
considered as a bonus instead of a royalty interest.
D. Contrasting the Griffith and Oklahoma Approaches
In the process of developing a legal methodology designed to ad-
dress and solve the problem of protecting the interests of the nonpartici-
pating owner from the executive owner, several competing policy
concerns necessarily arise. Specifically, courts should consider (1) the
certainty of outcome in any given situation, (2) flexibility in contracting,
and (3) protection of the interests of the nonparticipating owners.
Certainty of outcome should be a key policy concern in any legal
test because it affords individuals the notice necessary for making deci-
sions. No legal test should be so ambiguous and uncertain that an indi-
vidual cannot ascertain with reasonable certainty what the legal
consequences of his actions will be. Therefore, if the executive owner is
able to predict how a particular type of interest will be treated in the
event of a dispute, his ability to plan will naturally be enhanced. On the
69. The court noted that "the participating owner generally has a duty to exact for the nonex-
ecutive owner every benefit that he exacts for himself." Id. (citing Portwood v. Buckalew, 521
S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (emphasis added). In Portwood the Texas court, when faced with
the same question of whether the nonparticipating owner was to be allowed to participate in a cer-
tain additionally created interest, stated that:
Generally, where a party having executive leasing privileges enters into a transaction
in which he and the non-executive mineral holders are both interested and the executive is
authorized to act for both parties, he must exact for the non-executives every benefit that
he exacts for himself. If he could obtain overriding royalties or cash bonuses for the non-
executives and himself, it was his duty to have done so.
Portwood, 521 S.W.2d at 911.
70. Gungoll, 55 OKLA. B.J. at 973.
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other hand, without some kind of assurance that a particular type of in-
terest will be treated in a certain manner, the executive owner is relegated
to guessing how that interest may be treated by a court. Lack of cer-
tainty of outcome also promotes unnecessary litigation, a result that
neither parties to a lawsuit nor the courts can afford.
The right to contract freely for the terms and conditions that an
individual desires is one of the most highly valued rights recognized in
American society. Flexibility in contracting, as used in this context, af-
fords the executive owner the opportunity to contract with a lessee for
the terms that will be most beneficial to the executive's financial position
and needs. If one type of interest, be it either bonus, royalty, production
payment, 71 net profits interest,72 or some other type of interest, will be
the most financially beneficial to the executive owner, then he should be
allowed to contract for that type of interest without having his decision
influenced by whether he will have to share the revenues generated by the
interest with the nonparticipating owner. Of course, if the executive
owner is given unfettered flexibility in contracting with a lessee it will
enable him to always favor himself over the nonparticipating owner by
contracting around the rights of the nonparticipating owner. Specifi-
cally, the executive owner could create an additional interest in a lease in
which only he would be entitled to receive the revenues generated from
the interest. Disregard for the interests of the nonparticipating owner
under this scenario gives rise to the third major policy concern: protec-
tion of the interests of the nonparticipating owner.
As discussed previously, without a mechanism to protect the inter-
ests of the nonparticipating owner, the executive owner could control the
nonparticipating owner's benefits under any lease that the executive
owner enters into with a lessee.7" It is imperative, therefore, that a legal
approach concerned with the conflict of interest between the executive
owner and the nonparticipating owner should also address the question
of how to adequately protect the interests of the nonparticipating owner.
While these three compelling policy concerns may not be the only
considerations that a court would or should examine when attempting to
develop an approach to this problem, they are certainly the most impor-
tant concerns to be taken into account. Thus, this portion of the Com-
ment will examine the ways in which the Oklahoma approach and the
71. See supra note 10 (discussing the definition of a production payment).
72. See supra note 10 (discussing the definition of a net profits interest).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 13-19 (discussing the conflict of interest between the
executive and nonparticipating owners).
[Vol. 20:433
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Griffith approach address or fail to address the three important policy
concerns.
The Griffith approach74 promotes certainty of outcome in any given
situation because an executive owner will be able to ascertain with rela-
tive certainty how a particular additional interest will be interpreted by a
Texas court. If the interest bears the characteristic nature of a royalty as
defined in Griffith,75 then it will certainly be deemed a royalty interest.
Similarly, if the interest bears the characteristic nature of a bonus as de-
fined in Griffth,7 6 then it will be considered a bonus.
The Griffith approach does not, however, promote flexibility in con-
tracting. It does not allow the executive owner to contract for the type of
additional interest that will benefit him the most financially; rather it
forces the executive owner, if he wants to keep all of the revenues gener-
ated by an additional interest, to contract for an additional interest in
whatever lease benefit the nonparticipating owner is not permitted to
share in. Therefore, even in instances where a lessee is amenable to giv-
ing either more royalty for less bonus or less royalty for more bonus, the
executive owner will be forced to choose an alternative not on the basis of
what would most benefit him financially, but on the basis of whether he
will have to share the revenues generated with the nonparticipating
owner.
While the Griffith approach may appear to protect the interests of
the nonparticipating owner to some degree by not permitting the execu-
tive owner to contract around the nonparticipating owner's interests, its
protection of the nonparticipating owner is far from total. For even
though the executive owner will have to share the revenues generated by
an interest in which the nonparticipating owner shares, there is nothing
to keep the executive owner from structuring an additional interest re-
sembling another interest in which the nonparticipating owner does not
share, thus preventing the nonparticipating owner from receiving any of
the revenues generated by that interest.
In relation to the three competing policy concerns, the Oklahoma
approach is strong in some areas and weak in others. With regards to
certainty of outcome, the Oklahoma approach is much weaker than the
Griffith approach.77 Under the Oklahoma approach, an executive owner
will usually be unable to forecast how a court will construe the lease he is
74. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
77. See Gungoll, 55 Okla. B.J. at 973 (construction against the lessee in favor of the lessor);
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entering into and, more importantly, whether the additional interest
sought to be created will be interpreted as a bonus or a royalty. The
executive owner can only hope that the language used by the individual
drafting the lease (typically, the lessee), will be sufficiently unambiguous
for a court to decide that it was intended to create the type of interest
that the executive owner actually intended to create.
Although flexibility in contracting was a major flaw in the Griffith
approach, it appears to be present in the Oklahoma approach. Clearly,
the Oklahoma approach at least gives the executive owner the opportu-
nity to designate how a particular additionally created interest should be
considered,78 so long as he has properly manifested his intent in the lease
creating the additional interest. This affords the executive owner the
flexibility to create an interest that will be the most beneficial to his par-
ticular financial position.
Unfortunately, the Oklahoma approach does very little to protect
the interests of the nonparticipating owner because it forces the court to
interpret an oil and gas lease to determine the intentions of individuals
who did not have the best interests of the nonparticipating owner in mind
when the lease was being negotiated. Certainly, the lessee has no interest
in protecting the nonparticipating owner79 and it is the self-interest of the
executive owner/lessor which creates the problem of protecting the inter-
ests of the nonparticipating owner in the first place. Actually, this ap-
proach could even encourage the executive owner to contract around the
interests of the nonparticipating owner by properly evidencing his intent
to have an additionally created interest treated in a manner that would
preclude the nonparticipating owner from sharing in certain benefits.8 0
Therefore, the Oklahoma approach does not adequately protect the inter-
ests of the nonparticipating owner.
Both the Griffith approach and the Oklahoma approach inade-
quately address the three important policy concerns of certainty of out-
come, flexibility in contracting, and protection of the interests of the
Probst, 373 P.2d at 62 (typewritten terms control over printed terms); Sykes, 318 P.2d at 419 (usage
and custom).
78. See Gungoll, 55 Okla. B.J. at 973 (noting in dictum that had the additionally created over-
riding royalty interest "been intended by the executive to be a bonus, he could have easily specified
this in the lease.")
79. See Kimsey v. Fore, 593 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). In Kimsey, the lessee was
found to have aided and abetted the executive owners in breaching a duty found to be owed to the
nonexecutive owners and was thereby impliedly found to have breached the duty himself. Id. at 111-
13.
80. See Gungoll, 55 Okla. B.J. at 973.
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nonparticipating owner. However, an alternative approach that can sat-
isfy all three competing policy concerns can be formulated. This alterna-
tive is the subject of the remainder of this Comment.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
A. Introduction
Ideally, an alternative approach to the Oklahoma and Griffith ap-
proaches should combine the strengths of both approaches, while satisfy-
ing all three of the previously discussed policy concerns.
B. The Three Steps of the Alternative Approach
The alternative approach to be proposed and discussed involves the
following three steps which a court should take when attempting to as-
certain whether an executive owner should be permitted to favor himself
over a nonparticipating owner:
1. Check for a clearly expressed unequivocal statement in the lease
that the additionally created interest, regardless of whether it is
called a bonus or royalty, is intended to enure solely to the benefit
of the executive owner.
2. If such a statement appears in the lease, then it should be given the
effect intended by the executive owner and the interest should en-
ure solely to the benefit of the executive owner, unless, under the
circumstances, it would appear that to do so the executive owner
would violate a duty of good faith and utmost fair dealing owed to
the nonparticipating owner.
3. Absent a clearly expressed unequivocal statement that the addi-
tionally created interest is intended to enure solely to the benefit of
the executive owner, then it should be irrebuttably presumed that
the executive owner intended to benefit both himself and the non-
participating owner by creating the additional interest in the lease
and, therefore, both the executive and nonparticipating owners
should be permitted to share in the revenues generated by the
interest.
The proposed alternative approach attempts to combine the
strengths of both the Oklahoma and Griffith approaches while adding a
duty of good faith and utmost fair dealing on the part of the executive
owner to more fully protect the interests of the nonparticipating owner.
C. The Duty of Good Faith and Utmost Fair Dealing
The idea of the executive owner owing a duty to the nonparticipat-
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ing owner is not a new concept."' There are many other areas besides
lease benefit terms in which the nonparticipating owner needs some pro-
tection from the self-interest of the executive owner.s2 Judicial opinions
have expressed the nature of such a duty in many different forms:
1. Utmost fair dealing.8 3
2. Utmost fair dealing and diligence.8 4
3. The same good faith, care and diligence, which a trustee must use
in performing duties of a trust (a fiduciary duty).8 5
4. An implied convenant to protect the royalty interest 8 6
5. Utmost good faith.8 7
The concept of a duty on the part of the executive owner arose in
Texas in Schlittler v. Smith."8 In Schlittler, the owner of a fraction of
royalty interest claimed that the executive owner was required to lease
the minerals involved for a minimum '/s royalty. 9 Although the court
refused to force the executive to obtain a minimum Vth royalty when he
leased the minerals,9" it did state, in dictum, that "[o]f course, there
should be the utmost fair dealing on the part of the grantee [executive
owner] in this regard."91 Implicitly, the court recognized a duty of "ut-
most fair dealing" by the executive owner on the behalf of the nonpartici-
pating owner when the executive negotiates a royalty interest with a
lessee.
In Federal Land Bank v. United States92, the owner of a term roy-
alty interest93 sued the executive owner for failure to exercise the exclu-
81. See R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 27-32 (1971); H. WILLIAMS & C. MEY-
ERS, supra note 5, §§ 339.2, 339.3; Meyers & Ray, supra note 20 at 663-78; Comment, Duty of the
Exclusive Lease Right Owner to the Royalty Owner, 11 BAYLOR L. REv. 474 (1959).
82. Some of the areas where an executive may owe a duty to the nonexecutive include:
1) The duty to drill wells on the land.
2) The duty to lease the minerals.
3) The duty to lease within a reasonable time.
4) The duty to enforce implied lease covenants for the benefit of the nonexecutive.
See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, § 339.3 (wherein appears a complete discussion of
these various areas of duty as well as others).
83. Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, -, 101 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1937).
84. Federal Land Bank v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 788, 791 (Ct. CI. 1958).
85. Hollister Co. v. Cal-L Exploration Corp., 26 Cal. App. 3d 713, -, 102 Cal. Rptr. 919, 924
(1972).
86. Lamp v. Locke, 89 W. Va. 138, 108 S.E. 889 (1921).
87. Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 249 S.W.2d 269, 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
88. 128 Tex. 628, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937).
89. Id. at -, 101 S.W.2d at 544.
90. The court stated "we think that self-interest on the part of the grantee [executive owner]
may be trusted to protect the grantor [nonparticipating owner] as to the amount of royalty re-
served." Id. at -, 101 S.W.2d at 545.
91. Id.
92. 168 F. Supp. 788 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
93. A "term royalty interest" is one ofless than perpetual duration. Most are created to last for
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sive leasing rights within a reasonable time.94 The Court of Claims found
that the term royalty owner was entitled to recover95 and stated: "We
believe as between the mineral fee owner and the royalty owner there is
an implied covenant in the deed that the mineral fee owner will use the
utmost fair dealing and diligence in obtaining lease agreements in order
to protect the royalty owner's interest." 96
Kimsey v. Fore97 is another case that deals with the question of the
duty of the executive owner to lease the minerals within a reasonable
time so as not to harm the financial interests of the nonparticipating
owner.98 In Kimsey, the plaintiffs were owners of a term royalty interest
in the minerals.99 The executive owners negotiated a lease whereby the
primary term"I° of the lease extended beyond the expiration date of the
plaintiff's term royalty interest and the lessees of the minerals purposely
waited until after the plaintiff's term royalty interest had expired before
commencing drilling operations on the lease. 101 The court stated that
"the test of utmost fair dealing is an implied covenant arising from the
royalty deed which is imposed upon the owners of the executive right to
lease."10 2 Ultimately, the court not only held the executive owners liable
for the breach of such duty,"0 3 but also found the lessees guilty of a
breach of the same duty."
In Portwood v. Buckalewx°5 the executive owners leased interests in
a fixed period of time and so long thereafter as oil, gas, or other minerals are produced. See H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, at 765-66.
94. Federal Land Bank, 168 F. Supp. at 789.
95. The court in Federal Land Bank stated that:
There is an obligation on the part of the Government [the executive owner] to lease for
drilling if the facts show that wells on the adjacent land are producing oil and possibly
depleting the oil in place and recoverable from the land in question. This obligation arises




97. 593 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
98. Id at 112.
99. Id. at 108.
100. The primary term of an oil and gas lease is the period of time during which a lease may be
kept alive even though there is no production in paying quantities by virtue of drilling operations on
the leased premises or by the payment of a certain specified rental. After the expiration of the
primary term, the lease generally can be kept alive only by production of oil and gas in commercially
paying quantities. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, at 570.
101. Instructions to the operator of the lease read "DO NOT DRILL UNTIL MARCH, 1974
(Outstanding Royalty [for Plaintiffs] Expires 2/74)." Kimsey, 593 S.W.2d at 109.
102. Id. at 111.
103. Id. at 114.
104. Id. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
105. 521 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
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the minerals for specified bonus payments and a set V th royalty; they
then attempted to reserve solely for themselves excess royalty interests
ranging from 17.5% to 25%.106 Allegedly, these excess royalty interests
were reserved to compensate the executive owners for surface dam-
ages. 107 The nonexecutive owners brought suit to recover their respec-
tive shares of the excess royalty interest revenues. The court held that
the executive owners did not act with utmost fairness in dealing with the
interests of the nonexecutive owners 08 and refused to allow the executive
owners to reserve the excess royalty interests solely for themselves.109
While the Portwood case may appear to set forth an approach simi-
lar to the proposed alternative approach, such is not the case since the
nonexecutive owners were not also nonparticipating owners. They had
full right to participate in bonus or royalty interest revenues. °10 The
court even stated that the case did not involve a decision whether the
additionally created interest was a bonus or a royalty because the interest
was defined by Griffith to be a royalty as a matter of law."' Conse-
quently, it appears from this statement that had the question been
whether the additionally reserved interest was either a bonus or a roy-
alty, the court would have used the Griffith approach and determined it
to be a royalty. The case is important, however, because it is the only
case that has imposed a duty on the executive when reserving an addi-
tional interest solely for himself without regard for the interests of a
nonexecutive owner.
Fairness and the rationale in Portwood dictates that the duty of good
faith owed by the executive owner to the nonexecutive owner should be
expanded beyond the traditional boundaries"' to include the situation
where the executive owner attempts to exact additional lease benefits
106. Id. at 911, 914, 917.
107. Id. at 916.
108. Id. at 914, 916, 918.
109. The court felt it was unreasonable to reserve a 25% royalty to compensate for fifty to one
hundred dollars in surface damages. However, the court did note in dictum "[w]e are not to be
understood as holding that surface owners such as appellants may never demand and accept a rea-
sonable amount of surface damages solely for themselves. We are of the opinion that they may." Id.
at 918.
110. Id. at 909.
111. Id. at 912-13.
112. See also Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984) (the Texas Supreme Court recog-
nized a duty of fair dealing, but upheld the validity of the self-leasing arrangement of the executive
owner as not breaching such a duty); Morriss v. First Nat'l Bank, 249 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952) (the court determined that since the executive owner owed the nonparticipating royalty owner
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solely for himself. It is largely an exercise in semantics whether the duty
is expressed in terms of "good faith", "utmost good faith", "utmost good
faith and fair dealing", "due diligence", or some other standard. What is
important is that the duty should adequately protect the interests of the
nonparticipating owner by not allowing the executive owner to reserve an
additionally created interest solely for his benefit unless, under the cir-
cumstances of the particular situation, it would be fair and reasonable to
allow the executive owner to do so.
D. Analysis of the Alternative Approach in Relation to the Three
Competing Policy Concerns
The alternative approach attempts to address the three important
competing policy concerns discussed in relation to the Oklahoma and
Griffith approaches." 3 The first step of the alternative approach' per-
mits an executive owner to create an interest in addition to the bonus and
standard royalty interest and to reserve such additional interest solely for
himself, provided his intent is unequivocally expressed in the lease. The
purpose of this step is to provide the executive owner the needed flexibil-
ity in contracting with the lessee; it allows him to exact from the lessee
whatever he is able to exact. Should the executive owner prefer to own
one type of interest over another, then this approach would allow him to
contract for the particular type of interest and reserve it solely for him-
self, as opposed to the Griffith approach where an executive is absolutely
prohibited from reserving, solely for himself, an interest in which the
nonparticipating owner is entitled to share. Furthermore, this approach
does not involve defining whether a certain interest is a royalty or a bo-
nus as does Griffith;' ' 5 rather, it permits the executive owner to reserve
an additional interest solely for himself, regardless of whether it is a bo-
nus or a royalty. Of course, this approach is conditional on the executive
owner clearly expressing the requisite intent and, as will be discussed
later, not violating his duty to protect the interests of the nonparticipat-
ing owner.
Clearly, the alternative approach effectively promotes flexibility in
contracting by allowing the executive owner to contract for whatever
113. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
114. The first step of the proposed alternative approach requires a court to check for a clearly
expressed statement in the lease that the additionally created interest is intended to enure solely to
the benefit of the executive owner, regardless of whether it is called a bonus or a royalty.
115. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
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terms and lease benefits the lessee is willing to agree to. This result, in
turn, furthers the fundamental right of freedom to contract.
Although the alternative approach does promote some degree of
certainty of outcome, it does not provide as much certainty as the Griffith
approach." 6 Concededly, there are several areas in which uncertainty
will be manifested using the alternative approach. First, the alternative
approach requires the executive owner to clearly and unequivocally ex-
press his intention to reserve an additionally created interest solely for
himself in the lease. While the precise language necessary for expressing
a clear and unequivocal intent is currently unestablished, in most in-
stances it should be obvious to an executive owner whether the language
he has chosen to affect his intent will be sufficiently clear and unequivo-
cal. Thus, the level of uncertainty existing within this area should be
regarded as de minimis.
The next area of uncertainty arises in the second step of the alterna-
tive approach. In this step, a court must decide whether the executive
owner has breached the duty to protect the interests of the nonparticipat-
ing owner by reserving for himself an additional interest. 17 When a duty
is expressed in terms of "good faith," it may be difficult for the executive
owner to know, at the time he creates the interest, whether a court would
hold that he has violated the standard. However, the basic underlying
purpose of imposing a duty on the executive owner is to insure that an
executive owner be allowed to reserve an interest solely for his own bene-
fit only in those cases where it is fair and reasonable. The executive
owner should therefore be aware that in only a few narrow situations will
he ever be allowed to prevent the nonparticipating owner from sharing in
the revenues generated by an additionally created interest.
The policy concern of certainty of outcome cannot be totally effectu-
ated in this area. However, because total certainty of outcome would ob-
viate the executive owner's right to contract freely for the terms he
wishes to include in the contract, some uncertainty is probably the pre-
ferred state of affairs. Although there will always be some uncertainty as
to how each situation will be resolved by a court, the use of an objective
standard and the corresponding generation of case law should help to
reduce the uncertainty of outcome.
116. Id.
117. The second step of the proposed alternative approach requires a court to give effect to an
executive owner's intent to only benefit himself at the expense of the nonparticipating owner, when
to do so would not violate the duty of good faith and utmost fair dealing owed to the nonparticipat-
ing owner by the executive owner.
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The alternative approach goes much further toward protecting the
interests of the nonparticipating owner than either the Griffith or the
Oklahoma approach. As discussed previously, the Griffith approach at-
tempts to protect the nonparticipating owner by prohibiting the execu-
tive owner from contracting for the type of interest that the
nonparticipating owner would normally share in without sharing the rev-
enues generated by that interest with the nonparticipating owner. 118 For
example, if the nonparticipating owner shares in royalty revenues, then
the executive owner may never reserve a royalty interest solely for him-
self. However, in this situation the executive owner could simply seek a
higher bonus payment and less royalty or no royalty at all. Technically,
the Griffith approach could not prevent this arrangement since the
money received by the executive owner would be characterized as a bo-
nus, not a royalty.
The Oklahoma approach determines the intentions of the executive
owner when he reserved the additional interest." 9 If the executive owner
intended to create an interest in which the nonparticipating owner could
not share and reserved that interest solely for himself, then the executive
owner should be allowed to carry out that intent.1 20 Unfortunately, this
result leaves the nonparticipating owner without any recourse against the
executive owner for such action.
The second step of the alternative approach attempts to avoid the
problems created by the Oklahoma and Griffith approaches by permit-
ting an executive owner to reserve an additional interest solely for his
own benefit only in situations where it would not constitute a breach of
the duty imposed upon him to protect the interests of the nonparticipat-
ing owner. Although each case will turn upon its own particular set of
circumstances, there are several situations where an executive owner
might be able to reserve an additionally created interest for himself. Ex-
amples include those situations in which the additionally created interest
is intended to reasonably compensate the executive owner for surface
damages, 12 1 or when the nonparticipating owner either expressly con-
sents to the exclusive reservation of an additionally created interest by
the executive owner, or misleads the executive owner into reasonably be-
lieving that his consent has been given. These examples are far from
118. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
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inclusive and it must be stressed that each case should be decided upon
what is fair and reasonable based upon the particular circumstances.
Finally, the third step122 of the alternative approach protects the
interests of the nonparticipating owner by creating an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that the executive owner intended to benefit both himself and
the nonparticipating owner by his creation of the additional interest in
the lease, unless a contrary intention is clearly and unequivocally ex-
pressed in the lease as required by step one. The alternative approach,
therefore, affords the executive owner the opportunity to favor himself
over the nonparticipating owner. Conversely, if he fails to clearly and
unequivocally express his intention to reserve the additionally created
interest only for himself, the nonparticipating owner will be completely
protected by this presumption.
The alternative approach is a viable alternative to the Oklahoma
and Griffith approaches because it satisfactorily addresses the competing
policy concerns of certainty of outcome, flexibility in contracting, and
protection of the interests of the nonparticipating owner. It attempts to
provide an equitable balance among these competing concerns by assur-
ing the nonparticipating owner that he really does receive adequate pro-
tection from the self-interest of the executive owner.
V. CONCLUSION
In the process of negotiating lease benefit terms there exists the po-
tential for the executive owner to favor himself over the nonparticipating
owner. Accordingly, a judicial approach is needed which adequately
protects the interests of the nonparticipating owner while also permitting
the executive owner to contract for the terms he desires. At the same
time, this approach must provide sufficient notice to the executive owner
as to whether he may reserve a certain interest solely for himself in a
particular situation. The current approaches taken by the Texas and
Oklahoma courts are inadequate to effectuate these three important
concerns.
The alternative approach set forth in this Comment squarely ad-
dresses these three competing policy concerns and attempts to strike a
fair and equitable balance between them. Specifically, it affords the exec-
utive owner the flexibility necessary to enable him to freely contract for
122. The third step of the proposed alternative approach requires a court to presume that the
executive always intends to benefit both himself and the nonparticipating owner by his reservation of
an additional interest, absent a clearly expressed intent to the contrary.
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lease benefit terms which complement his own particular financial situa-
tion, provides the executive owner with sufficient certainty as to whether
he would be permitted to reserve an additional interest solely for his own
benefit, and finally, imposes upon the executive owner a duty to protect
the interests of the nonparticipating owner.
C. Randall Hill
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